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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
European Communities*
I. Constitutional and Institutional Matters
A. NEW COMMUNITY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
The proposal to establish the first Community, as distinct from national, Court
having only first instance jurisdiction to apply Community law, as distinct from
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the ECJ) which has first
instance, review, and appellate jurisdictions was discussed in these notes in a
previous issue. I The new court has now been created by Council Decision
88/591/ECSC, EEC, EURATOM. 2 It will consist of twelve judges, each of
whom may be called upon to act as Advocate-General, and will sit in chambers
of three or five judges (art. 2). It will be physically attached to the ECJ, in
Luxembourg (art. 1). Its jurisdiction is intended to lighten the burden of the ECJ
in hearing first instance cases, but is defined more narrowly than in the original
ECJ proposals. It can hear:
(i) labor disputes between the Communities and their employees,
(ii) certain actions by undertakings and associations of undertakings against
the Commission under the ECSC Treaty,
(iii) by natural or legal persons against any Community institution alleging
excess of powers (under art. 173, EEC) or failure to act (under art. 175,
EEC) in matters of competition law, and (iv) actions for damages
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1. Regional Developments: European Communities, 21 INT'L LAW. 571, 572-73 (1988); 22
INT'L LAW. 1227-28 (1988).
2. 31. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988).
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associated with the above-mentioned types of proceedings, brought by
the same plaintiff against a Community institution (art. 3).
The proposed jurisdiction in cases of dumping or illicit subsidies, however, is
deferred for reconsideration after two years of experience have been gained of the
working of the new court (art. 3(3)). Detailed consequential amendments are
made to the Protocols on the Statutes of the ECJ which are annexed to the ECSC,
EEC and EURATOM Treaties, and the appropriate interpretations applied to the
Treaties themselves (arts. 4- 10). It is expected that the new court will operate
beginning in January 1989 (art. 13) and that some cases already commenced
before the ECJ will be transferred to it (art. 14).
B. NEW CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN THE EEC AND EFTA STATES
A Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters has been drawn up and opened for signature at Lugano on
September 16, 1988. 3 This Convention is intended to extend the jurisdiction and
"full faith and credit" principles4 established between the EEC States 5 them-
selves by the Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968 (as amended by later
Accession Treaties, and as now applied in the national laws of the EEC States)
to the Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 6 which
have separate Free Trade Agreements, within the meaning of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), art. XXIV, with the EEC, and to
judicial relations between the courts of the EFTA States and those of the EEC
States. The EEC is not itself a Contracting Party (i.e., on behalf of its Member
States) to this Convention, 7 which is available only to EEC and EFTA States
(arts. 60, 61 and 62(l)(a)), or to other States invited with the unanimous
agreement of those States (art. 62(1)(b)). It becomes effective three months after
deposit of ratification instruments by both an EEC and an EFTA State (art.
61(3)). Existing conventions on these matters between any participant States are
3. The full text, with associated Protocols, Declarations and Final Act, is found at 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 319) 9-48 1988).
4. An account of those principles is beyond the scope of these notes. For a Commentary on the
Brussels Convention see. LASOK & STONE. CONFLICT OF LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1987): On
the Lugano Convention. see, Stone, The Lugano Convention on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments,
1988 Y.B. EUR. L.
5. Current members of the EEC are Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and West Germany.
6. Current members of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland.
7. Since the Lugano Convention, supra note 3. relates to purely civil, as well as commercial,
judgments of non-EEC courts, the conclusion of agreements with non-EEC States on such matters is
probably considered to be outside the EEC's "Commercial Policy" powers. These powers are
contained in arts. I I 1- 114, EEC Treaty, and outside its residual powers to attain "the objectives of
the Community" contained in art. 235. id.
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superseded (art. 55). The significance for transnational litigation in Europe if all,
or a substantial number of, the eligible States ratify or accede to this Convention,
is obvious.
II. Competition (Antitrust) Law
A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
In what has been hailed as the most important decision on the "extraterrito-
rial" applications of Community competition law (specifically art. 85, EEC
Treaty) since ICI v. EC Commission,8 and as "the European ALCOA," 9 the ECJ
has given its judgment in what is popularly known as the Wood Pulp case. to The
applicants were various producers of woodpulp established in Canada, Finland,
Sweden, and the United States, and two associations of such producers; one of
Finnish producers (Fincell), and one of the U.S. producers (KEA). All had been
the subjects of a Commission decision" finding violations of article 85, EEC,
and imposing fines, in respect of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices
in the exchange of price information and the horizontal fixing of prices of
woodpulp supplied by the producers to buyers in EEC Member States. In seeking
annulment of that decision before the ECJ the applicants argued that: since (i)
they were all established outside the EEC, and (ii) any relevant agreements,
decisions, or concerted practices were made or took place outside the EEC, the
EC Commission had no jurisdiction to interfere, still less to impose fines. Indeed
the Commission's decision was itself contrary to public international law, which
they alleged precluded a State from purporting to regulate the conduct of
non-nationals outside its own territory, even if the conduct produced economic
effects within that territory (the so-called "effects doctrine"); and from
interfering in what probably are the internal affairs of another State. KEA also
produced additional arguments: (i) that, assuming the Commission had jurisdic-
tion over KEA, public international law required that jurisdiction to be exercised
with great moderation, since KEA was in a position of alternative jeopardy,
being also subject to U.S. antitrust law, specifically the Webb-Pomerene Act of
1918, which definitely permitted the kind of arrangement regarding U.S. exports
in questions here and (ii) that KEA, a mere non-profit-making trade association
had on the facts no involvement in these arrangements and practices distinguish-
able from those of its members, so that to punish KEA would be to punish, in
effect, its members twice for the same offense (contrary to the principle of no
8. I.C.I. Ltd. v. EC Commission des Communautrs europdenes, 18 Recueil 619 (1972); II
Common Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972) (sometimes known as the Dyestuffs case).
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. A. AhIstrom Osakeytio v. EC Commission (Wood Pulp), 119881 4 Common Mkt. L.R.
Anti-Trust Supp. 901.
11. British Columbia Forest Prod. Ltd. v. EC Commission (Wood Pulp), 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 85) 1 (1985). 42 Common Mkt. L.R. 474 (1985).
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double jeopardy). Fincell and the Finnish producers also argued that in their
case, the matter was exclusively regulated by the Finland-EEC Free Trade
Agreement; article 23 of which, while containing competition provisions similar
in wording to article 85, EEC, envisaged that those provisions could only be
enforced by indirect, intergovernmental, diplomatic processes under article 27,
FTA, and not by direct cease and desist orders and fines against infringers
determined unilaterally by the Commission.
In a carefully worded judgment the ECJ avoided stating that the "effects
doctrine" was part of Community competition law, if that doctrine is interpreted
as giving a State subject-matter jurisdiction over acts done wholly abroad on the
sole basis of effects within that State's territory. It did not have to decide,
therefore, if that doctrine was contrary to public international law (as alleged);
nor whether, if contrary to public international law, Community law (in the form
of the effects doctrine) would prevail over public international law or vice versa.
Instead, the Court took the view that the violative conduct consisted of two
elements: the formation of the agreements, decisions, and concerts in question;
and their implementation. While the formation element might have occurred
outside EEC territory, that could hardly be conclusive of the jurisdiction
question. Otherwise, as the Court observed, parties could always flout compe-
tition laws with impunity merely by choosing to locate the formation stage of
their violating outside the jurisdiction. It was the implementation, not the
formation, that was important, and here these agreements, decisions, and
practices had all been implemented within the EEC, in the sense that the prices
advised, announced, and horizontally fixed had all been charged there. The fact
that some applicants had acted through local agents, subsidiaries, or branches
was irrelevant. It is undertakings as a whole that violate article 85, EEC, not
their particular local manifestations (though it is permissible to comment here
that the local manifestations are useful in establishing personal, rather than
subject-matter, jurisdiction if an imposed fine has to be collected by local
execution procedure under article 192, EEC). It followed, in the ECJ's view, that
because the agreements, decisions, and concepts in question were implemented
within the EEC, the prohibited conduct itself occurred there, and not merely its
effects. The Commission therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction over that
conduct, without having to rely on an "effects doctrine."
KEA's first argument was rejected, on the ground that the creation of export
associations within the exemption from U.S. antitrust law provided by the
Webb-Pomerene Act 1918 was permitted, not mandated, under U.S. law, so that
KEA and its members were not exposed to alternative jeopardy in being required
to comply with Community law. Accordingly, the question of the status of the
alternative jeopardy principle in either Community or public international law did
not arise. On the other hand, KEA's second argument was substantially accepted
by the Court, and the Commission's decision was annulled as regards KEA on
that ground.
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Fincell's and the Finnish producers' argument based on the Finald-EEC FTA
was also rejected. Here, the ECJ might have limited itself to observing that
article 23, FTA, and article 85, EEC, deal with two different kinds of
anticompetitive conduct. Article 23, FTA deals with conduct capable of affecting
trade between Finland and the EEC, i.e., external trade of the EEC, whereas
article 85, EEC, deals with conduct capable of affecting trade between Member
States of the EEC, i.e., internal trade of the EEC. Since the Commission in its
decision only expressed itself to be concerned with the latter trade,' 2 it was quite
right to base its decision only on article 85, EEC, and to use its undoubted
powers to enforce that article directly (given that there was evidence of a
capacity of the conduct of these applicants to affect that intra-Community trade).
It is true, of course, that the same conduct might also have affected (and no doubt
did affect) EEC-Finnish trade, which would have justified the Commission in
also pursuing its indirect diplomatic remedies through the FTA joint negotiating
committee with the Finnish Government, had it so chosen. Its failure to do this
could not by itself invalidate the procedures actually adopted under article 85,
EEC, with respect to a different trade. The ECJ seems to have gone further than
these arguments, in stating that article 23, FTA, envisages that both the EEC and
Finland have within their legal systems rules enabling action to be taken against
infringements of article 23, which the joint committee procedure, where used, is
designed to activate, and in the case of the EEC these rules are articles 85 and
86, EEC, and the implementing regulations made thereunder. With great respect
to the ECJ, while it is no doubt correct that article 23 does envisage the existence
of such implementing "national" rules, it is difficult to see how articles 85 and
86, EEC, and their implementing regulations, can be such rules, since they are
specifically concerned only with a different, intra-Community trade, as men-
tioned above. Indeed, it appears to be the case that the EEC simply does not have
the implementing rules envisaged by article 23 (and by the analogous articles in
the other EEC-EFTA State Free Trade Agreements), and while no doubt it should
have, the attempt to make articles 85 and 86, EEC, perform this function can, it
is submitted, only lead to confusing and unfortunate results. (U.S. antitrust law
does not have this particular problem, since the Sherman Act of 1890, sections
I and 2, are expressly concerned, following the commerce clause of the U.S.
Federal Constitution, with both the internal (interstate) and external trade of the
United States.) The ECJ's decision on these Finnish applications, therefore,
seems perfectly correct, but to be supported by overly broad reasoning.
While the ECJ's desire to avoid unnecessary discussion of the status of the
"effects doctrine" in public international law is understandable, the usefulness
and likely durability of the court's distinction between conduct "implemented"
12. See id. at 15. para. 80.
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in the EEC and conduct having "effects" in the EEC is open to query. Suppose
that all the applicants in this case had been careful to sell their woodpulp only on
delivery and payment terms external to the EEC,1 3 and only to wholly
independent EEC distributors, rather than to agents or subsidiaries; it is not clear
that they would (or should) thereby have escaped liability under EEC law,
although "implementation" in the EEC would then have been very marginal.
Surely competition law liability should not be avoidable by such simple devices,
if, as held in this case, the place of establishment of the parties, or of the
"formation" of the conduct is irrelevant. It should be emphasized again that the
case is concerned with subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction over
the applicants, which, of course, is a separate question.
B. DISTRIBUTION AND FRANCHISING AGREEMENTS
In Erauw-Jacquery 14 the ECJ had a new opportunity to apply the principles
on intellectual property licensing enunciated in the Maize Seed case 15 to a
license of plant variety rights. The ECJ held that certain sales and export bans
accepted by the licensee were within the legitimate protection of the licensor's
property rights as such, and so not infringements of article 85(1), EEC. Terms
as to minimum prices to be charged by the licensee, on the other hand, were
capable of being infringements. In Konica16 the Commission found that export
bans, and requirements to buy up parallel imports, imposed by a distributor on
wholesalers by the former's circular notice, were not mere unilateral conduct
of the distributor outside article 85(1), but were agreements if the wholesalers
accepted the obligation to comply, and concerted practices if there was actual
compliance. The Commission also found in this case that the Channel Islands
were part of EEC territory for competition law purposes, when used as a
channel to supply "mainland" EEC States. The precise status of the Channel
Islands with respect to various aspects of Community Law is often open to
doubt.
In ServiceMaster17 the Commission has taken its first decision in the field of
service franchise agreements, which the ECJ declared in the Pronuptia case
18
might require different treatment from distribution franchises. The Commission
13. E.g., "ex works," "free carrier" or "f.o.b. vessel" at a non-EEC port, as regards delivery,
and "conlirmed payment letter of credit" at a non-EEC bank, as regards payment.
14. Louis Erauw-Jacquery Sprl. v. La Hesbignonne Soci6td Cooperative. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 29) 11 (1988), 119881 4 Common Mkt. L.R. Anti-Trust Supp. 576.
15. L.C. Nungesser v. EC Commission des Communaut~s europdenes, 16 Recueil 2015 (1982),
36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278 (1983).
16. The Community v. Konica UK Ltd., 31 O.J. EUR. Costs. (No. L 78) 34 (1988), 1198814
Common Mkt. L.R. Anti-Trust Supp. 848.
17. Re the Franchise Agreements of Service Master, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 3321) 38
(1988), 119881 4 Common Mkt. L.R. Anti-Trust Supp. 895.
18. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Schillgallis, 45 Common Mkt. L.R. (1986). For notes on
franchise agreements, see 21 Irr'. LAW. 895, 1209 (1987).
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found that it could apply many of the same principles, and granted an article
85(3), EEC, exemption to this agreement, notwithstanding a ban on the franchise
from opening establishments or actively seeking customers for its cleaning and
maintenance services outside its allotted territory, since it remained free to
provide its services there from its "home" base on a "passive selling" basis. A
similar case, Charles Jourdan Group, 19 is also before the Commission.
C. TRANSPORT
In the field of air transport, the block exemption regulations, exempting
certain classes of agreements from the application of article 85(1) pursuant to
article 85(3), EEC, empowered by regulation 3976/87,20 have now been enacted.
They cover Scheduled Air Services and Slot Allocation at Airports Agreements
(reg. 2671/88);21 Computer Reservation Systems for Air Transport Services
(reg. 2672/88);22 and Ground Handling Services in Air Transport (reg.
2673/88).23 Meanwhile, the Commission has sent a reasoned opinion to the
Italian Government urging it to allow Aer Lingus to operate a service between
Dublin and Milan; 24 and to the Portuguese Government urging it to abandon its
discriminatory practice of subsidizing the fares charged by its national airline,
TAP, on flights to the Azores and Madeira only in the case of residents on those
islands who are Portuguese nationals, as contrary to article 90(1), EEC. The
government then agreed with the Commission that it would subsidize all EEC
nationals who were island residents. The case thus closely resembles that brought
against the Spanish Government in similar circumstances 25 where the Commis-
sion issued a formal decision under article 90(3), EEC, requiring termination of
the practice, involving the Canary and Balearic Islands residents. Finally, the
Commission has imposed a fine on Sabena Airlines for abusing its dominant
position in operating its Saphir computerized reservation system by excluding
London European Airways from access to the system. 26
In the field of road, rail, -and inland waterway transport, the ECJ has given its
first judgment, in AATIB v. EC Commission,27 upholding the Commission's
19. Charles Jourdan, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 220) 2 (1988), 119881 Common Mkt. L.R.
Anti-Trust Supp. 810.
20. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (1988). See these notes in 22 INT'L LAW. 1227, 1229-30
(1988) for a discussion.
21. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 9 (1988).
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Press Release IP(88)485: the Commission relying on the Council Decision of December 14,
1987. on Sharing Capacity and Access to Routes in Scheduled Air Services, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 374) 19 (1987).
25. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 28 (1987). See notes in 22 INT'L LAW. 569 (1988).
26. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 317) 47 (1988).
27. 119881 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. Anti-Trust Supp. 677.
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decision 2 8 against the practices of two associations of French inland waterway
operators (bargees) relating to prices and levies, taken under regulation
1017/68.29
D. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION (CONTRA TO ARTICLE 86, EEC)
In Tetra Pak30 the Commission has for the first time used article 86 (as
distinct from article 85), EEC, to strike at an exclusive license, i.e., of the
technology for sterilizing milk cartons. Having acquired the license from the
technology's developer, when it already had 90 percent of the relevant market,
Tetra Pak was able to exclude from the technology one of its small
competitors, which had earlier assisted in the development. The Commission
considered this exclusive acquisition and use of new technology by an already
dominant undertaking to be abusive and ordered the parties to negotiate
nonexclusive licenses. The case is also interesting because the Commission
stated that, while it agreed that the exclusive license fell within the scope of
regulation 2349/8431 creating a block exemption for patent license agreements,
because of the absence of effective competition for Tetra Pak, it would have
used its statutory powers to withdraw the benefit of that exemption in this case
had the parties not accepted nonexclusivity, thereby putting them in violation
of article 85(1) as well.
In Coca Cola Export32 the Commission found that the discount schemes
operated by an Italian Coca-Cola affiliate in supplying its customers were
abusive of its dominant position in the market for Cola-type soft drinks
(interestingly found to be a separate market from that for soft drinks generally).
The offending schemes provided for loyalty discounts for exclusive purchasing;
achieved-target discounts for minimum quantities purchased based on last year's
purchases; and whole-range discounts for purchases of other products from
different markets. On the other hand, discounts for minimum quantities per se,
or for carrying out promotional activity, were acceptable.
The Danish Fur Breeders Association33 has been fined 500,000 ECU (4 m
Kroner) for various violations of articles 85 and 86, EEC, relating to its practices
in selling furs through its selling agency, Danish Fur Sales, which, enjoying
one-third of world fur sales, was found to hold a dominant position in the EEC.
The principal objection was to the requirement that members sold only through
the agency, thus restricting new entrants to the market in fur auctions.
28. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 35 (1985).
29. 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968).
30. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 272) 27 (1988).
31. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984).
32. Press Release IP(88)615.
33. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 316) 43 (1988).
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